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Abstract Emotions play an important part in moral life. Within clinical ethics support
(CES), one should take into account the crucial role of emotions in moral cases in clinical
practice. In this paper, we present an Aristotelian approach to emotions. We argue that
CES can help participants deal with emotions by fostering a joint process of investigation
of the role of emotions in a case. This investigation goes beyond empathy with and moral
judgment of the emotions of the case presenter. In a moral case deliberation, the par-
ticipants are invited to place themselves in the position of the case presenter and to
investigate their own emotions in the situation. It is about critically assessing the facts in
the case that cause the emotion and the related (moral) thoughts that accompany the
emotion. It is also about finding the right emotion in a given situation and finding the right
balance in dealing with that emotion. These steps in the moral inquiry give rise to group
learning. It is a process of becoming open towards the perspectives of others, leading to
new insights into what is an appropriate emotion in the specific situation. We show how
this approach works in moral case deliberation. A physician presents a situation in which
he is faced with a pregnant woman who is about to deliver multiple extremely premature
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infants at the threshold of viability. The moral deliberation of the case and the emotions
therein leads to the participants’ conclusion that ‘‘compassion’’ is a more adequate
emotion than ‘‘sadness’’. The emotion ‘‘sadness’’ is pointed towards the tragedy that is
happening to the woman. The emotion ‘‘compassion’’ is pointed towards the woman; it
combines consideration and professional responsibility. Through the shift towards
compassion, participants experienced more creativity and freedom to deal with the sad
situation and to support the woman. The paper ends with an analysis and reflection on the
deliberation process. In the conclusion we argue for more attention to emotions in clinical
ethics support and offer some directions for doing this in the right way.
Keywords Emotions  Moral decision-making  Moral case deliberation  Clinical
ethics support services  Sadness  Compassion
Introduction
Emotions play a significant role in the practice of clinical ethics support (CES).1 There
are many different and sometimes opposite views on the relevance of emotions for CES
(Molewijk et al. 2011). Sometimes emotions are seen as irrelevant for CES or even as
factors that disturb or undermine CES. Moreover, emotions are often regarded as
essentially different from the moral domain. In bioethics, we see a primary focus on
rationality and rational reasoning (Walker 1998; Nussbaum 2001). Many ethical
theories explicitly or implicitly are based upon a rational anthropology: human beings in
general are understood as rational and reasonable beings (Schneider 1998; Walker 1998;
Haidt 2001), and in case they are not, ethicists should try to make human beings more
rational and reasonable. This rational anthropology accounts for mistrust of emotions in
general (Damasio 2003), and an ambivalent attitude towards emotions within CES.
Within the literature, little has been published on how one could or should deal with
emotions in CES in a practical or methodological way.
Whatever one thinks about the relationship of emotions and CES: we are faced
with their interrelatedness in every day practice and in every case which comes up
for moral inquiry. Emotions play a role in the actual case, in the moral judgments
and decision-making within that case, and in the process of discussing a case. Our
view on emotions is inspired by Aristotle (Aristotle 1923; Nussbaum 2001; Solbakk
2006). Aristotle considers emotion and moral reasoning to be internally related. In
Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics (NE), emotions are referred to as important,
because they move our thinking and acting (Molewijk et al. 2011). Through our
emotions, we know what is important for us. Thus, emotions contain knowledge.
This knowledge is not theoretical, but practical. It is developed through practice and
tells us how to act. Moral wisdom is being able to have the right emotions and act on
them in a concrete situation. Wisdom is not gained by discarding emotions, but
through developing the right emotion, appropriately suited to the situation.
1 CES is understood as any clinical ethics activity that is aiming at supporting dealing with moral issues
and questions in different ways (e.g., identification, reflection, education, decision-making, policy). These
activities can be performed out of different structures (e.g., ethics committees, ethics consultants, moral
deliberation, reflection groups).
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Based on an Aristotelian view of emotions, this paper presents a clinical ethics
case in which emotions played a significant role. It concerns a pediatrician on duty
in the hospital being faced with a pregnant woman about to deliver multiple
extremely premature infants at the threshold of viability. The case has been
discussed during an international workshop on emotions and moral deliberation.
The case was presented by the pediatrician. We will describe and reflect upon the
process of moral case deliberation and the specific role that emotions played in the
moral inquiry. Our aim with this paper is to exchange (reflections about) practical
experiences concerning the dealing with emotions within CES, and to develop
practical suggestions for dealing with emotions in a suitable way.
Moral Case Deliberation
Moral case deliberation (MCD) is a specific form of CES2 (Molewijk et al. 2008;
Abma et al. 2009; Widdershoven & Molewijk 2010). A MCD consists of a meeting
with health care professionals, clients, managers and so forth, who systematically
reflect on one of their moral questions within a concrete clinical case from their
practice. Questions often relate to the care situation (‘‘What should we consider as
the morally right thing to do in this specific situation and how should we do it
rightly?’’). Yet, more philosophical or conceptual questions in concrete situations
can also be investigated in a moral case deliberation (e.g., ‘‘What is respect?’’, or
‘‘What does understanding mean?’’). According to our approach to moral case
deliberation, the primary goal of a session is to create a critical and respectful moral
inquiry into both the moral issues in a clinical ethics case and the participants’
values and norms. Moral case deliberation aims at one or more of the following
goals: (1) to reflect on the case and to improve the quality of care within that case;
(2) to reflect on what it means to be a good professional and to enhance
professionals’ moral competencies, (3) to reflect on institutional or organizational
issues and to improve the quality of care at that level (Abma et al. 2009).
An MCD usually takes 45 minutes to 2 hours and is facilitated by a trained
facilitator. The facilitator, an ethicist or someone who is trained in clinical ethics
and the use of specific conversation methods (e.g., the Dilemma Method or the
Socratic Dialogue), does not give substantial advice and does not morally justify or
legitimize a specific decision. The expertise of the facilitator consists in fostering an
open and constructive dialogue among the participants, keeping an eye on the moral
dimension of the case, supporting the joint reasoning process, and helping the group
in planning actions in order to improve the quality of care (policy). Conversation
methods are a key ingredient of moral case deliberation. These methods delineate
several steps or phases in which the central moral question is investigated; they
structure the reasoning and deliberation process (Steinkamp & Gordijn 2003;
Ashcroft et al. 2005; Kessels et al. 2009; Molewijk & Ahlzen 2011). In this paper,
2 MCD differs in some essential aspects with clinical ethics consultation (e.g., the ethics facilitation
approach). For a brief description of some differences see Molewijk et al. (2011).
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the conversation method is based upon an Aristotelian approach to emotions. This
method is described in more detail elsewhere (Molewijk et al. 2011).
Case Presentation and Process of Deliberation
The case we will discuss was presented during a 1.5 hour international workshop on
‘‘the role of emotions in moral deliberation’’ in which around 20 international
participants from different disciplinary backgrounds participated.3 We will present a
chronological summary of the case discussion. In Three Ways of Dealing with
Emotions, we will reflect on some key elements related to the role of emotions in
the process of moral deliberation.
Three Ways of Dealing with Emotions
During the start of the workshop, participants were asked individually to recall a
situation which had bothered them and in which they had experienced a specific
emotion. The participants were asked to write down the extremes and the more
appropriate middle in dealing with this emotion. The following instruction was
given:
‘‘Remember a concrete situation that goes to your heart and in which you were
engaged. Check which emotion you had in that situation. Consider for instance the
following emotions: anger, apathy, love, sadness, loneliness, compassion, fear,
disgust, boredom, pride or joy. Imagine you are in that situation again. Write down
your answers to the following questions:
• What would you do when the emotion entirely leads you; in other words, when
the emotion controls your behavior?
• What would you do when you totally repress the emotion; in other words, when
the emotion is put aside?
• What would you do when you take the right attitude to the emotion; in other
words, when you have found the middle way between both extremes in your
action?’’
Everyone did the exercise in a silent internal conversation and wrote down the
three ways of dealing with emotions. After this, the facilitator asked who wanted
to present his case. One of the participants said he would like to do that. He had
recalled a situation in which he had been very sad. The situation still bothered
him. It was a case in which a pregnant woman was about to deliver multiple
extremely premature infants. The group decided to take this example for moral
deliberation.
3 The case presenter gave his informed consent for publication of this case. With respect to the clinical
case (i.e., the pregnant woman) we deleted any referrals to time and location. We also changed some parts
of the case in order to prevent recognition.
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Connecting the Emotions to the Facts
MCD Facilitator (F) ‘‘What was the primary emotion?’’
Case Presenter (CP) ‘‘Sadness. There were more emotions (such as fear and
anger), but the most prominent and crucial emotion was sadness.’’
F ‘‘What was the concrete situation in which the sadness emerged and in what
situation was it the strongest?’’
CP ‘‘I was most sad for the mother, for the loss of the joyful and hopeful
expectations about being pregnant and having children, and that she would
unfairly have to deal with such a difficult situation and be asked to make
decisions related to the dying process her children would experience (…). I
felt profound sadness, as if I was the mother myself and that I medically could
do nothing. Here the emotion was the strongest and connected with anger and
fear. This also happened because of my own experience then: I recently had
become a father. Furthermore, I was a young professional in training.’’
F ‘‘Can you read out the three ways of dealing with emotions that you just wrote
down?’’
CP 1 ‘‘Too much. Emotionally too involved in the situation of mother and the
loss of the premature infants. My feeling of sadness would interfere with
concentration and decision-making. Also, the emotion leads me too much
when the mother is overwhelmed with grief and begins crying or asking
questions with clear desperation and hope for a positive answer when there
is none. In this situation, feeling her pain, I could make errors by framing
my responses in a way that gives her at least partially what she wants to
hear rather than being 100% clear and honest. As a consequence, it could
also make me appear unprofessional or incapable of handling the medical
responsibility through the power of the emotion in the opinion of the
mother or my colleagues.
2 Too little. Not acknowledging the extreme sadness of the situation and the
effect it has not only on me, but certainly on the mother and other staff
members. There is no recognition of the emotions of mother and of
myself: no involvement. This would negatively impact my performance by
making me appear cold and uncaring to the mother. It also could manifest
itself in other unintended ways in my own life (poor sleep or appetite,
arguments with spouse, and so forth).
3 The right attitude. A right balance between a caring attitude (being a
human myself) and professional abilities (responsibility). It should be not
too emotionally involved and not a too technical attitude. Then it is
possible to perform my medical duties to the best of my abilities and yet
provide a warm, caring attitude towards the mother.’’
F ‘‘Does the note with the more appropriate middle correspond with what you
did in that situation?’
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CP ‘‘No: there was a little too much sadness, too much involvement with the
patient. Therefore, I had too little sight on what I had to do as a professional.
My discussions with the mother may not have been as clear and concise as
they could have been because I was internally distracted by my own sadness
and anger about the situation. I may have allowed some false hope as I wanted
so badly to give the mother answers that could alleviate her pain.’’
During the presentation of the case by the case presenter (with the help of the
facilitator) the focus was primarily on the facts of the case, the case presenter, what
the case presenter (retrospectively) considered as too much, too little and the right
attitude towards the emotion and the correspondence between the middle position
and the facts of the situation. The facilitator also asked the other participants: ‘‘What
do you want to know about this concrete situation with the pregnant woman so that
you become able to put yourself in the situation of the case-owner and his
emotion?’’
Various questions were asked, concerning the factual situation of the pregnant
woman (e.g., the treatment, the diagnosis, the prognosis) and of the case presenter
(e.g., his thoughts and behavior in that specific situation). The case presenter
informed the group about these facts and also noted that he worked in a neonatal
intensive care unit as a pediatric resident in training and that he was responsible
for the medical care. This information resulted in the following description of the
case:
‘‘I responded to an emergency on the Labor & Delivery Ward. A woman was
imminently going to deliver multiple extremely premature infants at the
threshold of viability. Very quickly we had to discuss her wishes for how
aggressive our resuscitation efforts should be, given that the prognosis was
very poor. The father of the children was not available at the time, and the
mother requested full resuscitative efforts. Some hours after the delivery, it
became apparent that the infants were not responding to our exhaustive efforts
to sustain their health, and the likelihood of death despite all of our
interventions became imminent. For the first time in my training, I was given
the responsibility of delivering the bad news to the mother and discussing the
options for withholding and withdrawing further life-sustaining medical
treatment for her children. At the same time, I was responsible for performing
the technical duties associated with their medical care (as well as that of other
premature infants in the NICU at that time).
It is rather difficult to characterize the myriad emotions I felt during this event.
They included shock, fear, anger, guilt, exhaustion and above all others,
profound sadness. Having recently become a father myself, I could not
imagine how much more heightened and painful those same emotions were
being experienced by the mother of the infants. The particular emotion of
sadness was difficult to deal with for fear that it would negatively affect my
abilities to perform my medical duties, and yet on a human level, seemed
important to experience along with the mother.’’
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Participants Imagine Being in the Same Situation as the Case Presenter
Then the facilitator asked the participants (P): ‘‘Put yourself in the place of the
example giver. Would you have the same emotion in this situation or another one?’’
Participants brought up different emotions: sadness, compassion, desperation, fear,
and anxiety.
Several participants said they would feel sadness in this situation. They saw the
situation as really sad for the mother. They could imagine that as a doctor they
would also feel sad, because they would not be able to do anything for the mother
and the children. One of the participants mentioned he had a different emotion. He
said: ‘‘I feel compassion in this situation.’’
F ‘‘Can you tell us the facts that emerged compassion in you? What kinds of
thoughts are connected with compassion?’’
P ‘‘I put myself in the situation of the mother: something terrible has happened to
her and to the infants during her pregnancy—her children will die and medically
I can do nothing for her and her infants; she is not to blame and she can do
nothing about it; then I feel compassion.’’
Imagining themselves in the situation, some participants mentioned emotions like
fear.
F ‘‘Can you tell us the facts and thoughts that emerged fear in you?’’
P ‘‘I would feel fear, because I would have to tell the mother that her infants will die
and that I would not be able to do anything as a pediatrician. I would think: ‘How
should I tell this bad news to a desperate mother?’ That would give me fear.’’
While talking about and further investigating these emotions, the case presenter
and the other participants recognized compassion as the most suitable to the
situation. Compassion implies being related to the mother, instead of identifying with
the disaster which is happening to her. In the emotion of sadness, there seems to be a
focus on the tragedy. In the emotion of compassion, there is more a focus on the
mother. As a professional you are not able to cure or prevent the tragedy; you only
can inform the mother about the facts of this tragedy. However, as a professional you
are able to support the mother in dealing with that tragedy. Compassion opens more
possibilities for openness towards both coping with the difficult situation and the
professional relationship with the mother. Fear blocks action.
During the moral inquiry process on ‘‘compassion’’ some participants asked: ‘‘Is
compassion an emotion or an excellence or a virtue?’’ During the answering of that
question, participants started to refer to theories, concepts and opinions. Hence, the
conversation slowly changed from a dialogue and moral inquiry into a discussion in
which different statements and abstract knowledge claims were used alternately.
The relationship with the concrete situation of the case disappeared. Such a
discussion can be useful but is not appropriate within a moral case deliberation.
Therefore, the facilitator redirected the process by asking the participants to return
to the emotions in the case and focus on the accompanying thoughts. He specifically
addressed the case presenter to reflect on the right middle ground for dealing with
the situation.
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F ‘‘Was there in the middle a free attitude towards the emotion of sadness?’’
CP ‘‘Not in the situation itself for me. It was an effort to stay in balance. However,
the moral inquiry right now gives me more freedom. I think and experience that
‘compassion’ fits more with a free professional attitude. A free attitude towards
the emotion allows me to acknowledge and empathize, but maintain composure,
communicate clearly and honestly and provide proper care.’’
Another participant
said
‘‘Was there perhaps too much closeness in your sadness?
Did your involvement or concern with the mother cause a lack
of appropriate professional distance?’’
Another participant
asked the CP
‘‘What did you do with your sadness towards the mother?’’
CP ‘‘I put my hand on her shoulder, so I showed my support and consolation.’’
Thus, the participants investigated in a concrete way what an appropriate emotion
would be in the situation. Participants were looking for an emotion which combines
a professional attitude with showing consideration and providing support and at the
same time being honest about the medical facts.
Lessons Learned
In the last phase of the moral case deliberation, the participants reflected upon what
they learned from the moral inquiry into the emotions. Participants referred to what
they learned from the process of moral inquiry and what they learned about the
emotion of sadness.
F ‘‘What were the lessons learned?’’
The participants mentioned the following lessons:
• ‘‘Be reflective about these emotional situations.’’
• ‘‘It is possible to think in another way. It is possible to bring the emotions in
agreement with the facts and with one’s own life experiences.’’
• ‘‘Recognize and acknowledge the emotions of the different persons, such as the
patient but also your own emotions.’’
• ‘‘Give words to the emotions.’’
• ‘‘Sometimes you have to just let there be sadness and experience it fully.’’
• ‘‘If you think about the goal of helping the mother and the children, then you can
experience your emotion without letting it getting out of hand.’’
Analysis of and Reflections on the Role of Emotions in Moral Deliberation
The case description shows that within clinical ethics support one can critically
reflect on emotions. By focusing on the emotion in the case, one can learn how to
deal with emotions in practice and integrate them in moral life. In order to focus on
the emotion and engage in a moral inquiry, one has to learn what one (as a facilitator
and as a group) should not do. In the example, the facilitator did not demonstrate a
counseling or caring attitude with respect to the case presenter. Too much empathy
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with the person’s emotions may decrease critical thinking. Moral deliberation is not
a counseling or peer-group session in which one person is ‘‘helped’’ and as a
consequence functions as ‘‘the’’ object of moral inquiry. A moral deliberation
involves a process of moral inquiry in which all participants assess their thinking,
feeling and behaving as if they were in the same situation of the case presenter. So
the case presenter is neither helped, nor morally judged about what he did or felt.
All participants reflect on their own thinking, feeling and behaving. To put it
succinctly: moral deliberation is primarily not about empathy but about moral
inquiry.4
The main task of the facilitator was to facilitate the group into reflections on the
emotion, dealing with the emotion and associated thoughts regarding the emotion.
In the reflection process, the facts of the case were used as an important anchor for
the inquiry process. In this way, emotions are not just individual and only subjective
experiences which cannot be dealt with in a reasonable way. One can respect (the
person who experiences) emotions and at the same time criticize them.5 Emotions
are not taken for granted; they are seen as part of a complex chain of reasoning,
interpretations and conclusions which can be assessed. During moral case
deliberation, emotions are scrutinized through a process of asking questions.
Thus, it is possible to investigate the appropriateness of the way in which people
deal with an emotion. The middle position can be morally assessed. The reason why
a certain way of dealing with an emotion is (not) appropriate can also be
investigated. The middle position emerges through reflection on what we consider
an appropriate ‘‘sadness’’ or ‘‘compassion’’ in relation to the facts in that case that
participants consider as important. For example, too much sadness could tempt the
pediatrician to misrepresent medical facts or to present the facts differently in order
to answer the woman’s desperate search for hope. Moreover, certain emotions can
be more appropriate than others. Thus, the group came to the conclusion that
compassion is a better emotion than sadness in the case under consideration,
because it does not imply identification with the woman, and enables a caring
attitude towards her.
In situations of moral uncertainty, unease, or stress, emotions often are
experienced as burdensome. Through the process of moral deliberation and
reflection upon emotions and associated thoughts, one learns to relate to the
emotions and the immediate appeal they make on us. This results in a situation in
which emotions do not linea recta guide us; our free space and critical thinking
increases.
4 It is important to inform the participants, and especially the case presenter, beforehand what the aim of
the moral case deliberation is (i.e., a moral inquiry into the moral question) and what they can expect to
happen. Often this is not enough: one also has to inform the participants what they should not expect (e.g.,
counseling or helping an individual or looking for psychological clarifications of certain behavior and
emotions).
5 In order to scrutinize emotions and at the same time respect the MCD participants, two important
features of moral case deliberation were acted upon: (1) people judge their emotions and their associated
thoughts only after the process of imagining themselves as if they were in the situation of the case
presenter; (2) criticism towards other participants’ emotions and thoughts are processed through the
process of asking questions (as opposed to making judgments).
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Finally, it is important to reflect upon what actually functions as ‘‘the case’’
within the moral case deliberation. Quite often, in clinical ethics case analysis or in
medical ethics teaching situations, participants reflect upon the case in order to
decide what is morally appropriate to do or to decide. During this reflection those
who reflect (i.e., the participants of the moral case deliberation) position themselves
outside of the case. In the example described above, the case was not a medical case
of a pregnant woman and her emotions, and neither was it a case about a
professional with his emotions, thoughts and decisions. During the deliberation
process, the case became the vehicle for reflection on the emotions of all the
participants. The focus was not on general ethical concepts, principles and
professional codes, but on the experiences and the reasoning process of the
participants in the group at that very moment.
To conclude, we asked the participants how they experienced this workshop on
the role of emotions in moral case deliberation. The case presenter gave the
following answer.
CP ‘‘In general terms, as a result of this exercise I have learned how important it is
to know yourself and your values and to give time for inner reflection when
faced with difficult situations. I also realize not only how emotions affect
thoughts and actions, but conversely how my thoughts can affect my emotions.
By keeping focus on the virtue I wish to achieve, my thoughts will help guide
the proper inclusion of emotions into my actions. The freedom to experience
the emotion while maintaining a grounded state comes directly from my
thoughts about the emotion itself.
In this specific example, I believe finding the balance of including emotions
into my thoughts and actions without allowing them to negatively impact my
primary goal of doing good and helping others is paramount. If confronted
with a similar situation in the future, I will continue to be open and honest with
my own emotions, but plan to allow myself private time to experience and
accept the sadness of a situation first. Then, I can begin to think more clearly
about what my primary responsibility is and how my emotions might affect
my thoughts and actions. I will also be sure to inquire openly with patients,
families and staff members about how their own personal emotions affect
them in similar ways.’’
Conclusion
Emotions play a crucial role in moral life. Moral case deliberation can help us to deal
with emotions by investigating them and reflecting upon them. Emotions should neither
be followed instinctively, nor be discarded and put aside. A proper way of dealing with
an emotion is finding the right middle ground between being overwhelmed and
remaining untouched. This is not just a matter of rationally determining a balance. One
has to be able to act in line with the right middle, and embody the appropriate attitude.
Dealing with emotions is a matter of virtue and character. Through the process of
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reflection one becomes aware of the intricacies in learning how to be a better
professional and how to respond more openly to the situation.
Addressing emotions in moral case deliberation requires a process of investi-
gation, which is neither driven by empathy, not by moral judgment. Empathy leads
to over-involvement with the case presenter. Moral judgment implies that one puts
oneself above the case presenter. A true dialogue goes beyond relativism and
objectivism (Bernstein 1983). In a dialogue, one learns from the other, not by taking
over immediately what the other says, but by investigating the relevance of the
experience of the other for one’s own situation (Gadamer 1960). In the example, the
examination of the emotion of the case presenter led to the conclusion that
engagement with the woman should not lead to sharing her sadness, but to showing
compassion. Thus, the emotion of the case presenter was put under critique. The
criticism was not made from a superior position, but developed through an
investigation of the experience of the case presenter and shared by the case
presenter. Thus, the group as a whole learned to see the limits of identification and
the need for combining personal consideration with professional action.
Reflecting on emotions requires staying close to the emotions. Theoretical
elaborations on virtue or excellence do not help to understand what it means to lead
a good life and be a good professional. Theoretical discussions go beyond emotions,
and make the deliberation process sterile and unfruitful. Reflection on emotions
requires being attentive of one’s emotions and focusing on the concrete actions to
which they give rise. It also requires being open to the fact that others may have
different emotions, and be prepared to investigate the differences and learn from
them. Thus, learning to deal with emotions is not an individual theoretical exercise,
but a joint dialogical investigation into what is important in our daily life.
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